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THE COURT OF APPEALS, 1954 TERM
Foreseeability of Injury
A convict on a prison farm working under minimal restraint escaped due
to the negligence of the guards, and perfected his escape by forcing decedent
through threats and duress to drive and transport him, which caused decedent
to suffer a fatal brain hemmorhage.
Decedent's representative sued the State for conscious pain and suffering
and wrongful death. The Court ruled unamimously against recovery,40 on the
rationale of lack of foreseeability and no duty owing to decedent.
Tort liability is occasioned when the actor negligently causes an unreasonable
risk to a class of persons to whom he owes a duty of care.41 The act charged
to be negligent must be the proximate cause of the injury, and reasonably fore-
seeable.42 The Court in the instant case asserted that the negligence of the State,
qua jailor, was not the proximate cause of the death of decedent, since the risk
was not reasonably foreseeable which defined the duty "to be obeyed"; 43 i.e., a
more rigorous vigil over the inmates. In support of this contention the Court
distinguished between restraint and punishment, stating that punishment is the
function of our penal institutions rather than the insulation of the prisoner from
society. On the strength of this dichotomy, the Court concluded that the State
owed no duty to decedent. The learned Court concedes that the State does incur
liability when it breaches its duty of restraint as to the mentally ill, since injury
as a result of an escape is patently foreseeable. 44 Secondly, the Court justifies its
refusal to grant recovery on the theory of the Mitchell doctrine,45 which requires a
physical impact as an essential requisite to recovery for negligently caused fright,
an element which was seemingly lacking here.
The decision in the instant case can perhaps best be justified on the ground
that there is a reluctance to sanction claims against the State;46 in addition, the
Court apparently is not prepared to discard the impact doctrine,47 although it has
40. 308 N. Y. 548, 127 N. E. 2d 545 (1955).
41. PROSSER, TORTS 165 (2d ed. 1955).
42. Paine4 v. City of New York, 277 N. Y. 393, 14 N. E. 2d 449 (1938); Shaw
v,. Irving Trut Co., 249 App. Div. 659, 291 N. Y. Supp. 571, aff'd, 274 N. Y. 632,
10 N. E. 2d 586 (1937).
43. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. R. Co., 248 N. Y. 339, 162 N. E. 99 (1928).
44. Scolavino v. State, 297 N. Y. 460, 74 N. E. 2d 174 (1947); Weihs v. State,
267 App. Div. 233, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 542 (3rd Dep't 1943); Jones v. State, 267 App.
DIv. 254, 45 N. Y. S. 2d 404 (3rd Dep't 1943).
45. Mitchell v. Rochester Railway Co., 151 N. Y. 107, 45 N. E. 354 (1896).
46. 28 ST. JOHN'S L. REv. 312.
47. 4 BUFFALO L. REV. 366.
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been greatly limited by exceptions4" and has been the subject of adverse criticism
by the great majority of text writers.49 On these bases the Court confined its
reasoning primarily to the consideration of the foreseeability test.
Proximate cause and foreseeability are not rigid mechanical rules; therefore,
their application must be dependent upon the particular facts of each case.5 0 It
would seem foreseeable that a convict, even a trusty, in an effort to escape without
means of rapid transportation to facilitate his flight, would force a passing motor-
ist to transport him. An equally probable result under these circumstances would
be that the escaping prisoner would use force, threats and duress to effect his
purposes, as in the instant case. And it seems highly reasonable that injury to a
passer-by would in some manner be effected.
Prima Facie Tort
In an action to recover damages for the malicious refusal of defendant union
to allow its members to work for plaintiffs on the same terms on which they
worked for other employers, the Court held,"' the union's "interference" with
plaintiff's business was not based solely on malicious motives, and so was justi-
fiable concerted activity.
The jury in the first instance had found that the defendant's activity was
solely malicious; the Appellate Division reversed, holding that the defendant had
the absolute right to refuse to allow members to work for the plaintiffs "for any
reason or for no reason at all";5 2 a concurring opinion stated that malice was a
relevant factor, but that in this case the evidence was insufficient to establish that
defendant's activity was prompted solely by malice. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the Appellate Division for essentially the same reasons as those in the Appellate
Division concurring opinion.
Unions are exempt from the anti-trust laws and may engage in concerted
activity against employers if their activities are directed toward a legal labor
objective.5 3 In this case, the defendant union apparently tried to harrass the
plaintiff corporation because its controlling stockholder (also a plaintiff) had at
48. Comstock v. Wilson, 257 N. Y. 231, 177 N. E. 431 (1931); Cohn v. Ansonia
Realty Co., 162 App Div. 791, 148 N. Y. Supp. 39 (1st Dep't 1914); Klumbach vi.Silver Mount Cemetery Ass'n., 242 App. Div. 843, 275 N. Y. Supp. 180 (2d Dep't
1934).
49. Throckmorton, Damages for Fright, 34 HARV. L. REV. 260.
50. Wheeler v. Horton, 92 App. Div. 368, 86 N. Y. Supp. 1095 (1st Dep't
1904).
51. Reinforce, Inc. v. Birney, 308 N. Y. 164, 124 N. E. 2d 104 (1954).
52. 282 App. Div. 736, 737, 122 N. Y. S. 2d 369 (2d Dep't 1953).
53. Natl Protective Assn. v. Cumming, 170 N. Y. 315, 63 N. E. 369 (1902);Opera on Tour v. Weber, 285f N. Y. 348, 34 N. E. 2d 349 (1941); N, Y. GENERAL
BUSINESS LAW §340(3).
